Dr. Sanity

argues that we need to abandon our notions of civilized war and fight terrorists and jihadists with much greater zeal.

I’ve said it before, but this reality is what I hate and despise most about these Islamic fanatics–who do not let reason or life interfere with their jihad; who abide by no treaties, follow no rules, and scorn the very values upon which western civilization is founded. We could have lived with them they did not insist that we must become what they are or die. But they have defined the groundrules (or the non-rules) of this conflict; and eventually, we will have to meet them at their level–or they will win. We should hold tight to the thought that it is they who have set the playing field.

This concept seems to be floating around some other blog sites as well, and of course has been brought up before.  The counter argument, perennially floated is that if we take this course we will destroy ourselves and the terrorists will win.

I am not at this time willing to embrace the concept of total war against jihadists without regards to collateral damage.  I still think that there is an opportunity to join with Muslims who are more moderate and that we can win while still using a huge degree of restraint.  At this point in the struggle at least, our raw power is so much greater than that of our adversaries that we can afford to limit ourselves.

Nonetheless, I do think it a concept worthy of deep thought and consideration.  General Sherman, whom many credit with the concept of total war, perhaps made the case best with this famous quote:

War is cruelty. There’s no use trying to reform it. The crueler it is, the sooner it will be over.

It is perhaps important to remember though that later in the same statement, Sherman promised the people of Atlanta that when war ended he would be the first to share what he had with them and protect them from harm.

I don’t think that there is a lot of evidence that adapting the successful, and even horrific, tactics of the enemy will cause us to become something other than what we are.  In WWII we certainly adapted the tactics of the German Army and there is no way to hide that we performed some horrific actions, notably the firebombing of Dresden and the nuclear strikes on Japan, in the course of prosecuting that conflict and bringing it to as quick of an end as we could.  It is perhaps also interesting to note that we followed Sherman’s ideas after that war better than we did in the civil war, by rebuilding and protecting Europe (the western portion at least) and Japan.

Clearly I think WWII did not cause us to become something other than what we were and it is obvious that despite the horrors of that war we were able afterwards to create strong and free allies from our former enemies.

One does have to wonder if perhaps this is not a better model to follow in the War on Terror than the current methods we are using.

Of course no two conflicts are the same, and the very structure of our enemies is designed to maximize the difference between the terrorists and those they hide within.  By not being states, they add a further degree of separation between themselves and the civilians they hide among (and sometimes behind) and make it harder for us to justify strategies or tactics that would harm those very civilians.  At the same time, they try to show (and may legitimately have) popular support from those civilians.

The Israel-Hezbollah conflict we are witnessing highlights this nicely.  Hezbollah of course claims large amounts of popular support in its territory, while at the same time by not being officially part of the Lebanese armed forces it is able to separate responsibility for its provocative attacks from the people of Lebanon.  When it suits them, they are legitimate representatives of the Lebanese people, when it doesn’t they are not in a continual slight of hand maneuver.

I don’t have any definitive answers for this.  I suspect it is the most important moral question our times and we will have to fumble about quite a bit to find a satisfactory solution.