Justus For All

Hanson’s prescription comes down to: exhort China, build missile defense systems, and redeploy troops away from the DMZ. He states no measure that could be taken if the first doesn’t work. He advocates a missile defense system — which uniquely works against ICBM’s — at the same time he apparently doesn’t think that North Korea is designing ICBM’s (if North Korea gives a bomb to Al Qaeda, as Hanson thinks is likely, it’s more likely to be something like a suitcase bomb). And the third option seems self-defeating, bizarre, and peevish. Which of these presciptions do you agree with? And I’d recommend you read this link for another view on North Korea.

I don’t see anything in that link which is substantially different from other analysis, including VDH’s. In the end, all it says is North Korean nukes suck and disarming North Korea without triggering a collapse will be tough. I certainly agree with that.

At the same time, while there are downsides to a collapse, there are upsides as well. The perfect scenario would of course be a soft-landing and peaceful change of regime. I don’t think there is anything we can do that will guarantee that result though. Having China take the lead, since China has a undoubtably better understanding of the players involved is the best chance.

I don’t know that I would characterize this tactic as ‘extorting’ China, although certainly I suppose it is in some ways. North Korea is a client state of China, propped up by Chinese support. It is therefore appropriate to expect China to take the lead in handling the problem. It is also appropriate to clearly explain to China the consequences of not handling the problem, particularly that consequence is a nuclear armed Japan. I call that diplomacy, not extortion.

If China doesn’t agree to get serious with NK, even in the face of possible Japanese nukes, then I suppose we will have to look at other options. We will not really be any worse of than we are now. If, on the other hand, we go into bilateral negotions with North Korea and that doesn’t work out, particularly if we make another deal that NK reneges on, it will be more difficult to convince China to take the lead in the future, as they will expect that when the pressure mounts again, we will once again buy off NK. The only permanent solution is either a military attack or Chinese intervention. Since the first will be horrible for the region, doing everything we can to ensure that the second happens seems reasonable.

So I agree with that one.

As for missile defense, I am sure that VDH is quite aware that NK is in fact working on long range missile technology. After all, the failed test last summer was watched closely and certainly anyone who is at all interested in such things is well aware of it. North Korean nukes present TWO dangers. The possibility that they might be used directly via missile, and the possibility that they might be sold to third parties. Just because there are two dangers doesn’t mean that we should ignore either, and not prepare to defend against either. There are a variety of measures in place to help prevent NK nukes from reaching a third party, or being shipped to the U.S. Preventing delivery via missile is also a good plan.

So I support that one.

As for the withdrawal from the DMZ, I am somewhat agnostic on that. VDH makes good arguements for why it would help. Perhaps you could make good arguements for why it would not work, besides dismissing it out of hand. I don’t think it would make a huge difference one way or the other.

So I don’t care a lot about that one.

I don’t see anything in that link which is substantially different from other analysis, including VDH’s.

Really? The link makes clear that the Bush administration’s failure to engage Kim when he wanted to was a tremendous blunder, a view Kaplan’s expressed before. Also, Kaplan takes a diametrically opposing viewpoint of the desirability of Japan going nuclear. And he doesn’t advocate an anti-ballistic missile system. And he doesn’t advocate a pullback from the DMZ. It seems like there’s a lot of difference between Kaplan and VDH to me.

By the way, you misread my post — I said exhort China, not extort China. Meaning that we can urge China on all we want, but we really have no remedy if China doesn’t play along, as they have little apparent desire to. Which means that we have to rely more on ourselves. Which makes bilateral negotiations all the more our only real option.

If, on the other hand, we go into bilateral negotions with North Korea and that doesn’t work out, particularly if we make another deal that NK reneges on

You leave out two important parts of the story: the U.S. and South Korea were the first to renege on the deal by not building light water reactors for North Korea in return for North korea subjecting its plutonium rods to an inspection regime. And the second thing you leave out is that North Korea technically didn’t renege on the deal, which was to keep their plutonium rods locked up and subject to inspection. Instead, they began enriching uranium, which violates the spirit if not the letter of the agreement, and violated its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but it’s also a lot harder to make weapons by uranium emrichment than by getting plutonium rods out.

North Korea really fully “reneged” when the Bush Administration confronted it with evidence that it was enriching uranium, North Korea admitted and wanted talks including a security guarantee, and the Bush administration rejected it out of hand.

It’s also insidious to use such language because the implication is that aside from non-solutions like an anti-missile defense system and pleading with China to do something they don’t want to do, the only alternative is to rely on the goodwill of the Dear Leader. Which was not the case and is not the only option now: a verifiable inpsections regime was done before and can be done again.

Preventing delivery via missile is also a good plan.

It’s a plan that also fails a cost-benefit analysis. If North Korea really can inflict damage on the U.S. mainland (which is far from clear nowl by the way), why would they do it the much more expensive way that they don’t have the technology for now when they can just put it on a suitcase or plant it in some cargo that we’re not inspecting now?

Yes, he says it was a blunder. That is one line out of an article that is almost entirely devoted to what is and why the situation is tough. On those issues, Kaplan and VDH agree completely. The article does consider Japan nuclear weapons as a negative effect of the North Korean developments (I veiw them as a neutral effect for us, but negatives for others.) The Kaplan article doesn’t go into what we should do to solve the problem at all, or offer any suggestions in what tactics to take next.

You say we can only ask China nicely. I think we can do more than that, we can make it clear that other things that they don’t want (Japanese nuclear weapons for example) will happen if they don’t fix the problem. China is rational, there is a point when the costs of disarming North Korea will be less than the cost of not doing that.

I don’t believe that there is any such thing as a ‘viable inspections regimen.’ Inspections can confirm disarmament if that is what a nation wishes to do, for example South Africa and Libya. They are very poor at making sure that a nation that wants nuclear weapons, or to engage in continual nuclear development blackmail, will not be able to do so. At the best, they will leave us wondering if we really know everything.

That is probably a fundamental worldview difference that we don’t be able to easily resolve.

As for missile defense, I will certainly concede that if the only goal North Korea had was to cause nuclear destruction on an American city then it would not be much good. Obviously though, you don’t think that is there only goal and neither do I.

Nuclear missiles have a whole lot of advantages over delivering a weapon on a cargo ship. First off, there is an active program to interdict and inspect North Korean carge. Secondly, there is the time factor. Unless North Korea wants to start a war, they have to use nuclear weapons in response to something that we do (either strikes or sanctions or something.) You can lauch a missile in response to an air strike, you can’t send out a covert deployment team in response to such a thing, there isn’t time.

North Korea wants the capability to inflict damage on the U.S. mainland, they don’t want to inflict that damage. The cargo ship method doesn’t give them that. Missile would, and missile defense would take it away.