Doubling Down in Iraq
This Weekly Standard article is well worth reading. Here is probably the key point:
The difficulties the Army has experienced in Iraq are due, in large measure, to the fact that the Defense Department forgot this historical lesson. Donald Rumsfeld tried to run a businesslike war. But warfare is not business; it is not fought at the margin. By striving to do just enough to win, we have done too little. The right strategy is to do too much.
That is especially true of a war like the one in Iraq. Consider these data: Between November 2004 and February 2005, according to the Brookings Institution’s Iraq Index, the number of coalition soldiers in Iraq rose by 18,000. In that time, the number of Iraqi civilians killed fell by two-thirds, and the number of American troops wounded fell by three-fourths. The soldiers were soon pulled out; by the summer of 2005, American and Iraqi casualties rose again. Later that year, the same thing happened again. Between September and November of 2005, another 23,000 soldiers were deployed in Iraq; once again, both Iraqi and American casualties fell. In the early months of 2006, the number of soldiers fell again, and casualties spiraled up.
The picture is clear: More soldiers mean less violence, hence fewer casualties. The larger the manpower investment in the war, the smaller the war’s cost, to Iraqis and Americans alike. Iraq is not an unwinnable war: Rather, as the data just cited show, it is a war we have chosen not to win. And the difference between success and failure is not 300,000 more soldiers, as some would have it. One-tenth that number would make a large difference, and has done so in the past. One-sixth would likely prove decisive.
I have certainly been skeptical that the mistakes in Iraq are due to Rusmfeld and that dramatically more troops would be the answer, however this piece presents a compelling argument that the failure to push for moderately more troops has been a key problem.
I do agree though that an increase of troops in Iraq now, following the Democratic electoral victory, has a great chance of success. Certainly it is likley that insurgent forces have stepped up the tempo in Iraq over recent months with the U.S. elections in mind, and having obtained the result they presumably wanted, to have the U.S. respond by increasing its commitment in Iraq would doubtless be a devasting blow to their morale.
Is this possible? That is hard to say. I have hoped that in power the Democrats would become more than naysayers, and that they would look beyond ‘cut and run’ as options in Iraq. Some Democratic supports have expressed assuarance this this would indeed happen. It remains obvious though that many on that side, both policians and partisans, want to leave immediately. Some even desire defeat for its own sake, as they feel that that is precisely what America deserves for getting involved in the first place.
It seems that a clear choice is before us, and the Democratic Party in particular.



Certainly it is likley that insurgent forces have stepped up the tempo in Iraq over recent months with the U.S. elections in mind, and having obtained the result they presumably wanted, to have the U.S. respond by increasing its commitment in Iraq would doubtless be a devasting blow to their morale.
Do you have any authority to back up that statement?