To win in Iraq
This Washington Times op-ed (via Instapundit) proposes a different tactic for the War in Iraq:
Unlike U.S.-led coalition troops, the adversaries in this war do not carry arms openly, wear uniforms or insignias and abide by other laws and customs of wars specified in Geneva Conventions and protocols. They instill fear in military opponents and local populations through use of suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices, kidnappings and beheadings. And they disguise themselves as civilians and hide among civilian populations with weapons stored and discharged from mosques, schools, hospitals, marketplaces, private residences and public roads.
To prevail, the United States has to transition from a conventional to an unconventional war footing and make the enemy pay a heavy price for its despicable tactics. In Iraq and elsewhere, traditional troops, weapons and tactics are less useful than tools of influence, covert operations and intelligence brought to the battlefield by special operators working harmoniously with indigenous forces and local populations. The prime objective is to create a climate of fear within enemy ranks that breaks its will to continue the armed insurrection against the freely elected Iraqi government.
I agree that this tactic would probably have a great deal of success in bringing stability to Iraq. It seems though to be anti-thetical to establishing a democratic Iraqi nation. Special operations have their place of course, and they certainly have uses in Iraq, but a pacification campaign based upon merely creating a ‘climate of fear’ within the insurgents doesn’t seem to useful.
Any unconventional war operates not based upon the direct damage it can inflict, but primarily upon the psychological uncertainty from death that can result anywhere, anytime. It is at its heart expressly and purpusefully outside the rule of law and the rules of war. We don’t wish to merely end insurgency operations in Iraq, but also to build Iraqi institutions that can enforce a monopoly on the use of violence while operating under rule of law. The first part of that is reletively easy to accomplish, but the later extremely difficult. Not the least difficult aspect of establishing rule of law is obtaining the trust of the people that law, and not for example tribal loyalties, will be the basis of government actions.
I think that the best way forward at this point in time is directly working on building up that trust. This will not be easy to accomplish, but a ‘broken windows’ strategy where we work with the Iraqi’s to combat government corruption, even minor corruption might be the smartest way forward. Doing this directly at a local level (along side with an increase in rebuilding funds administered by our local U.S. commanders working with Iraqis) as well as at higher levels would be appropriate. This would be a long term project of course, and wouldn’t effect that insurgent situation generally in the short term, keeping things from getting worse would be required, but we should also not expect them to quickly get better.
The other actionable strategy would be to do whatever it takes, including military action if necessary (although I am convinced it would not be necessary if our will was clear) to prevent Iraq’s neighbors from supporting the insurgency. Make it clear that we will consider supporting Iraqi insurgents to be an act of war against the U.S. and that we will respond appropriately and I suspect that a lot of that support will disappear quite quickly.
