FAQ on ‘the Surge’
Dean Barnett at Hugh Hewitt.com posts a FAQ on what differences the increased troop deployment will actually entail. (via Running for the Right)
I have to admit, the first answer surprised me, and forces me to re-evaluate my thought of the surge being to small to make a signifigant difference.
1) How in the hell are an additional 20,000 troops going to make such a big difference when we already have about 140,000 troops in Iraq? It makes no sense! Cut and run!!First, calm down. We’re going to walk through this analytically, not sprint through it hysterically. The current troop level in Baghdad is only 13,000. Most of the 20,000 new troops are going to be headed to Baghdad. That means we’re going to increase our troop complement in Baghdad by roughly 150%. In other words, as regards the Battle of Baghdad, this is an enormous tactical adjustment, not a symbolic gesture.
The rest of the FAQ is interesting as well, but this one point is certainly the one that matters most.
Baghdad is the key to Iraq, and certainly the one place where, whether we like it or not, a sectarian division simply isn’t possible. It is composed of Sunnis and Shiites, intermixed in many cases, in different neighborhoods in others, but certainly impossible to division along sectarian lines.
Certainly the central government of Iraq must control it, including the neighborhoods currently controlled by the Sadrist militias, if it is to be an effective government.
Meanwhile, via Instapundit, Omar of Iraq The Model reports that insurgents and sectarian militias are already preparing to reposition their forces outside of Baghdad:
Both cases indicate that the bad guys are adjusting their plans as the government and US military adjust theirs. The clear and hold tactic means militants will have little chance to maneuver within Baghdad like they used to do to work around previous crackdowns so now they are planning to make long-range maneuvers in provinces outside Baghdad.
One of the unfortunate things about war is that the bad guys get to do stuff too. It would be a whole lot easier if they would simply stay where they are and let us destroy them entirely according to our plan. Still, this is a risky manuever for them. If they abandon Baghdad without a fight, or without much of one, they risk raising the morale of the Iraqi forces and the morale of the U.S. populace at home (the morale of U.S. forces seems to be plenty high already.) In addition, if the Iraqi forces can be established well enough, the eventual drawdrown of the U.S. forces from Baghdad won’t matter, and the anti-government forces won’t be able to return. That of course is our goal.
My guess is that there will be some increased fighting, enough to make that pages of the newpapers and lead the nightly news accounts. Obviously, just a few ‘fierce’ battles will reinforce the perception here that we are in an unwinable situation. Beyond that though, the various anti-government forces will have to find some way to be able to re-establish themsevles in Baghdad after the surge ends. Targetting the Iraqi police and Army recruitment is a possiblity there, but given that that has been happening from the beginning, I am not sure they can escallate enough to make a difference. Frankly, it seems to me that they won’t be in a very good position at that point.
There is of course other progress that needs to be made, largely political within the Iraqi government itself. I hope that getting the insurgents, and in particular the Sadrist militias, out of Baghdad will make those political changes possible, but certainly a signifigant amount of statesmanship will have to arrise from Iraqi politicians themselves.
