Comments on: Re-assessing Iraq, Just Wars etc

By: Dave Justus

Dave Justus — Wed, 17 Jan 2007 12:50:57 +0000

The could element does matter in a whole lot of things, but sometimes the best choice is to just try and hope.

As an example, whether the Union could when the Civil War was very questionable, at least at the time, but Lincoln felt that it must be attempted. A similar dynamic existed in WWII.

Beyond that though, you can never really know if you ‘could’ do something unless you try. We won’t ever know if we could have stopped the Rwandan Genocide, but we will always know that we didn’t make any meaningful attemp. I personally find that something to be ashamed of. I would rather our nation had tried and failed, then not tried at all.

If Democracy in Iraq can’t succeed because of some intrinsic thing that is wrong with Iraqis (and the other Arab and Muslim nations in the region) then it is almost certain that we will never have peace with them. That will leave us with some very unpalatable options in how to deal with the problem, and it is something we will have to deal with eventually even if we ‘redeploy’ now. Before those options are even considered, I want to know that we did our best to avoid them.

However, I also think that we CAN succeed in Iraq. I don’t believe that there is anything wrong with the Iraqi people that makes them unsuitable for Democracy. I think a small minority of Iraqis, fueled by hostile powers that wish to ensure we don’t succeed there are the root of the problem, with time and effort those forces can be defeated.

By: Ron Davison

Ron Davison — Wed, 17 Jan 2007 01:10:58 +0000

I guess I’m not clear from reading your posting as to whether you think Iraq is a “should” or a “could” be done. Darfur strikes me as a “should” but it’s not clear that the politics and social dynamics there would make any solution lasting, which makes me question whether it is a “could” be done. You could argue that Iraq was a “should” in the same way, but are you saying that you don’t think that the “could” element of the policy matters?

By: Dave Justus

Dave Justus — Tue, 16 Jan 2007 17:52:56 +0000

Well, universal acceptance of anything is a pretty high bar to set.

By: probligo

probligo — Tue, 16 Jan 2007 17:24:21 +0000

Dave, I have to admire your honesty and your tenacity.

What would it take to change my mind on Iraq? There are several…

Concrete evidence of manufacture of bio and chem weapons.
Concrete evidence of advances in the production of material and technology for nuclear weapons.
Universal acceptance and support for the introduction of American style “democracy”.

As you are well aware, I do believe Saddam was a problem that needed to be resolved - at some stage. I think that Bush has not got anything other than that idea right.

So sad.

By: The Anchoress » Linking around - Chastity, Berger, UFO’s and more

The Anchoress » Linking around - Chastity, Berger, UFO’s and more — Tue, 16 Jan 2007 17:08:20 +0000

[…] Dave Justus says he still things Iraq will work, but even if it can’t work, we needed to try. I’m with him on that. And if democracy cannot work in the Middle East we need to know that, too, so we can be clear about what we’re up against in the future. […]

By: Dave Justus

Dave Justus — Tue, 16 Jan 2007 15:27:25 +0000

WMD for me was always the legal pretext, but never the strategic reason. That being said though, if I was convinced that Bush lied about what the administration knew about Iraqi WMD, as you are talking about, I would be very critical, possibly up to supporting impeachment. That has little to do with Iraq itself though, and more to do with our own democratic institutions.

By: k. pablo

k. pablo — Tue, 16 Jan 2007 15:18:46 +0000

What would change my mind on Iraq? Well, as far as initiating OIF in the first place:

1. I would have to be convinced the Administration had iron-clad evidence that there were no WMD’s in Iraq. In the face of UNCERTAINTY, given the poor track record of the CIA and other intelligence organs, Bush had to act. Management of uncertainty is one of the areas of decision-making that gets poor press, but in the age of potential nuclear terror, pre-emption becomes a viable option.

2. Iraq would have to not be the critical strategic crossroads — the schwerpunkt,/i>, if you prefer — of sectarian and energy politics.